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This paper reports an experiment intended to test a particular hypothesis derived from
blindsight research, which we name the “source misidentification hypothesis.” Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, a subject may be correct about a stimulus without being correct
about how she had access to this knowledge (whether the stimulus was visual, auditory,
or something else). We test this hypothesis in healthy subjects, asking them to report
whether a masked stimulus was presented auditorily or visually, what the stimulus was,
and how clearly they experienced the stimulus using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS).
We suggest that knowledge about perceptual modality may be a necessary precondition
in order to issue correct reports of which stimulus was presented. Furthermore, we find
that PAS ratings correlate with correctness, and that subjects are at chance level when
reporting no conscious experience of the stimulus.To demonstrate that particular levels of
reporting accuracy are obtained, we employ a statistical strategy, which operationally tests
the hypothesis of non-equality, such that the usual rejection of the null-hypothesis admits
the conclusion of equivalence.
Keywords: consciousness, visual perception, auditory perception, multimodal integration, experience
INTRODUCTION
The experiment, reported and discussed below, will test a pos-
sible dissociation between conscious access to the content of a
visual or auditory perception, and access to information about
perceptual modality. Intuition and some theories about conscious
perception predict that a correct representation of content cru-
cially involves knowledge about whether this content was visual
or auditory. However, other theories, specifically relating to the
study of blindsight, defend a “source misidentification hypoth-
esis” according to which stimulus and modality identification
must rely on independent processes. Resolving this question will
have an important impact on several aspects of consciousness
research, particularly those studying relations between conscious
and unconscious cognition.
Recent years have seen a great increase in experimental inves-
tigations of how different cognitive and neural processes relate to
conscious experience. However, as recognized in the field, there
are certain methodological difficulties when trying to pin down
such neural correlates (Metzinger, 2000; Hohwy, 2007). For one
thing, it is very difficult to agree on a good candidate for a contrast
in experiments using subtraction methods such as fMRI, ERP,
and cognitive-behavioral measures. Based upon the assumption
of pure insertion, the goal is to identify a pure contrast in which
all cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes are identical
in the control and interest condition, except for those specif-
ically related to conscious experience (Overgaard, 2011). Two
well-studied examples are the phenomena of blindsight and sub-
liminal perception in healthy individuals (Overgaard, 2012). Both
cases have been suggested as possible “pure contrasts” as they are
defined as performance above chance in the absence of conscious
experience.
In recent discussions, the nature of both contrasts has been
challenged. A number of experiments indicate that for both blind-
sight and subliminal perception, conscious experience, and correct
reports about visual stimuli seem to correlate very well (Overgaard
et al., 2008; Sandberg et al., 2010; Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012).
In other words, there are empirical reasons not to think of the two
cases as “contrasts” in the sense above.
In most cases, of course, subjective and objective reports go
together (Del Cul et al., 2007), yet important differences in inter-
pretation arise in those cases where they do not. In recent pub-
lications, we find more integrative interpretations that do not
directly go against subliminal perception and blindsight as con-
trasts between conscious and unconscious processes, but do go
against them as “pure.” For instance, Aru, Bachmann, Singer, and
Melloni (Aru et al., 2012) show how a classical view of neural
correlates of consciousness as the results of contrasts between con-
scious and unconscious conditions should be considered as much
www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 116 | 1
Overgaard et al. Consciousness and modality
more complex, involving neural activations prior to and following
the “moment in time” conscious experience occurs. Kouider and
Dehaene (2007) also suggest that a clear distinction between “con-
scious” and “not conscious” might be too superficial and provide
evidence to support “preconscious” processes. Both perspectives
suggest in the present context that blindsight might not necessarily
illustrate a “simple” contrast between conscious and unconscious
perception, and that the exact nature of the preserved perceptual
functions in blindsight is still unknown.
Most experiments that suggest subliminal perception rely either
on dichotomous reports (“did you see it yes or no”?) or scales with
arbitrary numbers of scale points (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004).
One methodological innovation is the technique of discussing
subjective ratings with the subject prior to the experiment, which
yields greater variation in the clarity of reported conscious expe-
riences, as in the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) (Soto et al.,
2011). The PAS is a four-point scale containing the following clas-
sifications: (CI) “clear image”, (ACI) “almost clear image” (WG)
“weak glimpse”, and (NS) “not seen”. Using this method, we have
shown that subliminal perception effects, obtained in the same
experimental paradigm with a dichotomous report, fully disappear
(Overgaard et al., 2006, 2008, 2010). The experiments indicate that
at least some findings of unconscious visual identification abilities
are the result of insensitive measures of conscious experience, and
that more accurate measure of conscious experience show a more
reliable correlation with objective task performance (Overgaard
et al., 2006).
This methodologically rooted discussion has far reaching con-
sequences as much of cognitive neuroscience theory is heavily
influenced by the idea that most of our mental events, even com-
plex events with semantic contents (Marcel, 1983), occur in the
total absence of conscious experience and that self-reports in gen-
eral are highly fallible. One defense of blindsight and subliminal
perception taken as instances of visual abilities (e.g., stimulus
identification) in the total absence of conscious experience is
to say that although conscious experiences may be associated
with visual stimuli, these experiences are not in themselves visual
(Weiskrantz et al., 1995; Cowey, 2004; Kauffmann, 2009; Brogaard,
2011; Kauffmann, forthcoming). Such a view argues for an empir-
ical separation between the neural representation of knowledge of
the presented stimulus versus knowledge of which sensory modal-
ity has actually perceived the presented stimulus. The view is here
named the “source misidentification hypothesis.” The hypothe-
sis would in principle allow experiences of visual (or auditory)
objects, which subjects however do not experience as visual (or
auditory). Logically, the hypothesis rests on three assumptions:
first that a decision regarding the modality responsible for per-
ceiving a stimulus is cognitively accessed in a different way or by
a different process than is the stimulus itself, second that the two
processes are independent and dissociable so that we are able to
know about the perceptual modality without the ability to identify
a stimulus and third, most crucially that we are able to identify a
stimulus without any knowledge about which modality actually
perceived this stimulus.
Regarding the first assumption, although it may be true, it is
not backed by any existing empirical evidence. Regarding the sec-
ond, it consists of two dissociations. Whereas the first dissociation
intuitively seems plausible, the second – that we might correctly
identify a stimulus presented to us without knowledge of how it
was perceived – is particularly counter-intuitive, as we are appar-
ently almost always readily capable of issuing true reports about
a sensory modality if questioned. Nevertheless, this is the crucial
assumption upon which the defense is resting.
The assumption is however empirically testable. It is an empiri-
cal matter whether (1) the ability to identify the perceptual modal-
ity correlates with conscious experience just as stimulus identifica-
tion does according to previous research (Overgaard et al., 2006),
and (2) whether there are significant interactions between correct
identifications of stimuli and of modality (Kauffmann, 2009).
Thus, two mutually exclusive hypotheses can be contrasted:
from an “intuitive” standpoint, it would be expected that the
correct identification of stimuli is dependent on the correct iden-
tification of perceptual modality (and perhaps even vice versa).
Based on the previous studies using PAS, it may furthermore be
expected that correct identifications correlate with reports regard-
ing the clarity of conscious perception. The source misidentifica-
tion hypothesis, however, would expect that the two identification
tasks are independent and that they both may exist subliminally.
Below, we report an experiment contrasting these two
hypotheses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The experiment was conducted according to principles in the Dec-
laration of Helsinki and the local Ethical Committee for Northern
Denmark. According to the local committee, no ethical application
was necessary for this type of study.
Verbal consent was obtained from each participant, which by
local ethics is considered sufficient for behavioral, non-biomedical
studies. Work was carried out directly under the ethics committees’
requirements.
Fourteen students from Aalborg University participated volun-
tarily in the experiment (seven females, seven males; mean age,
23.3 years). One male subject was however excluded as he misun-
derstood instructions. All reported normal hearing and normal
or corrected-to-normal vision with no history of neurological or
psychiatric problems. All subjects signed an informed consent.
APPARATUS
The subjects were seated in a dimly illuminated room at a table
facing a 13.3′′ LED screen (resolution 1280× 800). Visual stim-
uli were presented on a gray background on a monitor at 60 Hz
placed 70 cm in front of the subjects’ eyes. Stimuli were presented
using PsychoPy version 1.61 (Peirce, 2007). Auditory stimuli were
adjusted on latency and loudness using Audacity.
STIMULI AND NOISE
Stimuli consisted of four vowels, “A,”“E,”“U,” and “Y.” These vow-
els were selected in pilot studies, where they demonstrated equal
visual and auditory detection thresholds when presented in a mask
of noise. Visual letters extended 1˚ and were presented for 333 ms
centrally on the monitor. They were capital white letters of the
Arial font type. Auditory letters had a duration of circa 100 ms
and were presented from headphones. They were obtained from
translate.google.com using a female voice. The experiment ran on
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a MacBook Pro 2.4 GHz Core2 A1278 and visual stimuli were pre-
sented on a 13.3′′ 60 Hz monitor. Auditory letters had a duration
of 100 ms and were presented from Sennheiser HD 25-1 11 head-
phones. They were synchronized using the software Audacity, and
were presented as“the names of the letters”rather than the sounds.
The auditory stimuli were mono, 44100 Hz, 32-bit float.
Prior to the experiment, all participants were introduced to the
stimuli without masking. Hereafter, they could try the experiment
and discuss matters of doubt with the experimenter before the
actual experiment started.
All visual stimuli were superimposed on a mask. The visual
mask consisted of random 1 pixel black and white dots, with a
Gaussian transparency mask with three standard deviations at 3˚
radius. The mask was updated every frame. The auditory mask
was brown noise with a power decrease of 6 dB per octave.
TRIAL PROCEDURE
The experimental procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. Only one
stimulus (either visual or auditory) was presented in each trial.
Subjects answered three questions regarding the stimulus. First,
they rated the clarity of their experience of the stimulus using the
PAS scale and keys “1”–“4” representing PAS-NS-CI. Second, they
answered which stimulus they perceived, using buttons “A,” ”E,”
“U,” and “Y.” Third, they answered in which modality the stimu-
lus was presented, using button “8” for “heard it” (audio) and “0”
for “saw it” (visual). The order of the latter two questions alter-
nated from block to block, i.e., within subjects. The procedure is
illustrated in Figure 1.
We decided to keep the order of the PAS rating and the identifi-
cation task fixed as previous pilot experiments with PAS and highly
similar paradigms showed no effect of this. Rather, an alternation
FIGURE 1 | Experimental trial procedure. A fixation cross and a beep
were presented 1s prior to every trial. Both masks were presented
simultaneously for 3 s. Stimuli were superimposed on the mask at a
random time between 1.5 and 2.5 s after mask initiation. Subjects reported
experienced clarity using PAS, stimulus content, and perceptual modality
after each trial.
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might increase wrong responses, as subjects can be confused about
which question they are answering when responding quickly.
The experiment included nine blocks of 20 trials each. There
were 60 visual trials, 60 auditory trials, and 60 blank trials, which
were presented in random order. Participants were not informed
about the presence of blank trials. They served the function of a
“control condition” to test whether subjects, as expected, reported
“PAS=NS” in the absence of a stimulus.
INSTRUCTIONS
Participants were instructed in the use of PAS. Subjects were
encouraged to take their time to consider their response and use
their intuition when reporting stimulus and modality. Subjects
initially practiced on 24 auditory and visual trials with gradually
declining stimulus intensities. Any confusion was discussed with
the experimenter.
ADJUSTMENT
The purpose of the adjustment was to find stimulus intensities that
were slightly above each subject’s threshold, thus eliciting mostly
PAS-NS and PAS-WG responses. Following the introduction, stim-
ulus intensities were adjusted so that the average PAS responses
for each subject were in the range of 1.25–1.75 (“1” being NS
and “2” WG) within each modality. Visual intensity was adjusted
using opacity and auditory intensity was adjusted using volume.
Visual and auditory trials were presented in random order and
the program evaluated the average PAS response every five visual
trials and every five auditory trials. If the average was within the
desired range, the modality-specific intensity was recorded. If the
PAS-average was out of range, the modality-specific intensity was
adjusted appropriately, weighted by the deviation from the desired
average. The adjustment continued until at least two intensities
were recorded for each modality. The program then proceeded to
the actual experiment, using the average of the recorded intensities
for each modality. Between 46 and 177 trials were required for a
successful adjustment.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
One of our main hypotheses concerns a demonstration that the
probability of correct report of stimulus and modality is at base-
chance if NS is reported on PAS. The fundamental maxim in
statistics is to establish evidence against a hypothesis, i.e., evidence
is based on falsification of the hypothesis. Assuming a particular
value for probability of correct report such as 25 or 50%, usual sta-
tistical practice is to attempt to reject this value with the observed
data. In our case, however, we have the opposite interest, namely
testing whether the data is consistent with a certain probability
value. Effectively, we would like to accept the null-hypothesis.
However, accepting a hypothesis based on observed data is prob-
lematic because the probability that our decision to accept the
hypothesis is incorrect is unknown. In contrast, the probability
of rejecting a true hypothesis, i.e., the probability of a false rejec-
tion, is fixed when the test is performed, and the probability level is
decided by the experimenter, with 1 or 5% being the typical values.
Hence it is known, that there is a 1 or 5% risk of falsely rejecting a
hypothesis, which is the so-called type I error. On the other hand,
accepting a hypothesis, which is indeed false, is an error of type
II, and the probability of committing this incorrect decision is
unknown for the particular test. Indeed, it is directly related to the
test power (one minus the power), but post hoc power analysis is
not meaningful.
We can apply standard statistical reasoning by reformulating
the hypothesis. Instead of testing the hypothesis claiming that the
probability of correct report is 50%, we test the hypothesis that
this probability differs from 50% by a certain margin. If this new
hypothesis can be rejected given the observed data, usual statisti-
cal practice permits the conclusion that the probability of correct
report is chance level, to within the margins in the hypothesis.
Since this procedure is now based on falsification, we reobtain
the usual protection against a false decision at a prespecified level
such as the 5% level. Although this is an “omnibus” approach to
assess equivalence, the details of the implementation depends on
the particular statistical test. Discussions of this approach in the
setting of bioequivalence trials have been the focus of other recent
publications (Berger and Hsu, 1996).
In this work we examine the relations between PAS and correct-
ness of stimulus and modality reports using logistic regression.
Therefore we need to implement the non-equivalence approach
for this setting. Since multiple reports were obtained for each sub-
ject, we employ a mixed-model approach with a random effect
for subject, to account for the correlation between reports from
the same subject. We also included a time component to assess
whether the effect of PAS was confounded by a learning effect.
A test for whether probability of correct stimulus report takes
a certain value or lies in a certain interval corresponds to test-
ing equivalent hypotheses for the regression (or beta-) coefficients
in the logistic regression. These tests are based on the distribu-
tion of the coefficient under the null-hypothesis, which for the
usual hypothesis beta= 0 is a t -distribution. The additional vari-
ation due to estimation of the random effect is accounted for by
adjusting the degrees of freedom (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000). The
test of non-equivalence can be formulated as the probability being
outside the interval (50%−margin; 50%+margin), i.e., the proba-
bility differs from 50% by more than a specified tolerance margin.
A straightforward approach to testing the interval hypothesis is
to test two one-sided hypotheses (i) probability< (50%−margin)
and (ii) probability> (50%+ margin). If both (i) and (ii) can be
rejected at the 5% level, then we may conclude that the proba-
bility is within the interval (50%−margin; 50% +margin). Since
the non-equivalence hypothesis is the union of the one-sided tests
(i) and (ii), it follows from the intersection-union (IU) principle
(Berger and Hsu, 1996) that the size of the overall test is equal to the
size of the individual tests. Therefore, we test the non-equivalence
hypothesis by testing the two one-sided hypothesis (i) and (ii) at
level alpha= 5%. We take the p-value to be the largest p-value for
the one-sided tests. We illustrate the application of this test using
a margin of 10% centered on chance level, although we note that
that the interval does not need to be symmetric.
Since most statistical software packages do not readily provide
the one-sided tests with non-zero values, we note that the non-
equivalence can be performed using the two limits of the 90%
confidence interval (Berger and Hsu, 1996). If the lower limit
of the 90% CI is below the downward limit of the equivalence
region, then the alpha= 5% level t -test for (i) cannot be rejected.
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Analogously, if the upper limit of the 90% CI exceeds the upward
boundary of the equivalence region, then (ii) cannot be rejected.
Since the reverse implications are also true, we can reject the inter-
val hypothesis and declare equivalence if and only if the 90% CI is
fully contained in the equivalence region. Thus there is an opera-
tional equivalence (Berger and Hsu, 1996) between the test of the
two one-sided tests (i, ii) and the 90% CI procedure. However the
90% CI should be considered only as a practical test “instrument”
leading to a dichotomous decision (whereas the actual tests in (i)
and (ii) yield a p-value). There is no conceptual overlap with the
interpretation of the CI as covering the true parameter value with
a certain probability. Confidence intervals are calculated through-
out the manuscript as parameter estimate ± the standard error
multiplied by the relevant quantile of the null-distribution.
To assess the stochastic dependence between correctness of
modality and stimulus report, we used a loglinear model and a
bivariate logistic regression with PAS level as a modulator for both
outcomes as well as their odds ratio. The latter model admits a
formal test for equal dependence between stimulus and modal-
ity report at different levels of PAS. Analyses were performed in
R version (2.10.1), with packages MASS version 7.3-17 and lme4
version 0.999375-42.
Inference in the logistic regression and loglinear models is
based on t -tests and likelihood ratio tests (chi-squared tests). The
Wilcoxon signed rank test is applied to test for difference in sen-
sitivity and specificity in modality identification at PAS=NS and
PAS=WG. A bivariate logistic regression model is used to assess
the dependence between performance in modality and stimulus
identification at different PAS levels.
RESULTS
The average stimulus intensities obtained in the calibration was
97.6± 0.5% transparency for visual stimuli and 17± 4% volume
for auditory stimuli across subjects. As the adjustment procedure
aimed for PAS reports to be in the range of 1.25–1.75 (“1” being
NS and “2” WG), an illustration of the frequency of the PAS cat-
egories show that NS and WG have been used almost exclusively
(see Figure 2).
Subjects reported which letter was presented (one of four let-
ters), experienced perceptual clarity using PAS, and perceptual
modality (auditory or visual). We employed a mixed-model logis-
tic regression with ”correct/incorrect” as outcome and a random
effect for subject. In this way, as in previous papers, we used PAS
as predictor of another variable to study their relation.
The learning effect was not significant [t (1543)= 1.43,
p= 0.15] and was not included in further analyses. In the logistic
regression model fitted across all trials with correctness of stimu-
lus report as outcome and PAS as predictor and a random effect
for subject, the probability of correct report when PAS=NS was
0.27, with± one standard error interval (0.25, 0.30) and 95% con-
fidence intervals (0.23; 0.33), suggesting there is no indication of
subliminal perception since the estimate is approximately chance
level (0.25) with little variation around this value (see Figure 3).
As a formal assessment, we tested the hypothesis that the proba-
bility of correct report is <0.15 or >0.35 using the IU principle
as described above. As p= 0.003 [t (1544)=−2.79], we can reject
the hypothesis that the probability of correct report is outside
FIGURE 2 | Frequency of PAS reports for visual, auditory, and control
trials.We could only analyze NS and WG type responses, as ACI and CI
were very infrequent due to the adjustment procedure. As expected, the
great majority of control trials were rated NS.
FIGURE 3 | Correctness of stimulus report as a function of PAS.The
likelihood of correct stimulus report when PAS=NS (27%) is close to the
chance level of 25%, whereas higher degrees of perception correlate with
progressively higher accuracy.
the interval (0.15; 0.35). Equivalently, we see that the 90% CI
is (0.23; 0.32) is fully contained in the equivalence region, lead-
ing to a rejection of the null-hypothesis of non-equivalence. The
narrowness of the CI suggests that performance could be deter-
mined to be equivalent to chance level within a smaller margin
than 10%.
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The probability of correct stimulus identification as PAS=WG
is 0.46, SE interval (0.43, 0.49), which is significantly different from
PAS=NS, p< 0.001 [t (1544)= 7.07]. This corresponds to an
odds ratio of 2.25 with confidence interval (1.80; 2.82) indicating
a substantial increase in correctness when PAS=WG compared to
NS. The standard deviation of the random effect for subject was
0.36 with 95% CI (0.22, 0.60). This suggests some response bias
across subjects, with some subjects consistently being more cor-
rect than others. The 95% CI corresponds to a subject variation
between 21 and 35% in stimulus correctness at PAS=NS.
In a similar model, with correctness of modality report as out-
come and PAS as predictor, it is shown that the probability of
correct modality report when PAS=NS is 0.52, SE interval (0.49,
0.55), with 95% confidence interval (0.47; 0.58). This is, again,
very close to chance level (0.5). The hypothesis prob< 0.40 or
prob> 0.60 is rejected with p= 0.004 [t (1544)=−2.68] suggest-
ing the probability of correct modality identification is equivalent
to 50% within a 10% margin. The 90% CI is [0.47; 0.57] which
indicates the actual equivalence region may be smaller. The learn-
ing effect was not significant [t (1543)= 0.12, p= 0.90] and was
omitted from the analyses.
There is a significant difference between identification correct-
ness for PAS=NS and PAS=WG, p< 0.001 [t (1544)= 10.86],
corresponding to an odds ratio of 3.84, CI (3.01; 4.90).
The standard deviation of modality correctness at subject level
(response bias) for PAS=NS was 0.34 with 95% CI (0.20, 0.58),
corresponding to an interval of between 44 and 61%.
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, PAS predicts performance in
both models, so that, at PAS=NS, subjects have neither subliminal
access to information about the stimulus or the correct modality.
It seems conscious experience, however vague, is a necessary pre-
condition for the ability to correctly identify stimulus as well as
modality. We note that the confidence interval for modality cor-
rectness is very broad for PAS=CL, which we believe results from
very few (seven) reports, which produces statistical uncertainty
about the parameter estimate.
To further assess a PAS-dependent ability to identify auditory
relative to visual stimulus, we calculated sensitivity and specificity
for the modality reports. We use as sensitivity the probability of
correctly reporting modality as auditory in auditory cases, and
specificity the probability of correctly reporting modality as visual
in the visual cases. In Figure 5 we plot the sensitivity (true positive
rate) against the false positive rate (one-specificity) to parallel a
receiver operator characteristics (ROC) curve, where points close
to the identity line indicate no predictive ability in contrast to
points in the upper left corner with high discriminatory perfor-
mance. Indeed for PAS=NS points cluster on the middle of the
identity line corresponding to 50% probability of correct identi-
fication in both auditory and visual cases. At PAS=WG there is
a clear trend toward high true positive rate and low false posi-
tive rate, indicating substantially improved discriminatory power,
however with four subjects demonstrating a tendency to under-
perform on the visual task (false positive rate exceeding 30%).
The increase in sensitivity as well as decrease in false positive rate
when PAS=WG instead of NS, are both significant [one-sample
Wilcoxon test, V = 8, p= 0.006, (sensitivity), V = 88, p= 0.001
(false positive rate)].
FIGURE 4 | Correctness and 95% CI for modality report as a function of
PAS report. Correctness of modality report is associated with degree of
perception, with correctness at 52% for PAS=NS, which is close to chance
level (50%). The broadness of the 95% CI at PAS=CI ensues from the
sparsity of observations due to the calibration procedure (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 5 |True positive and false positive rates for the detection of
auditory stimulus versus visual stimulus for the N =13 subjects. At
PAS=NS points center on the identity line and with true and false positive
rates around 0.5, supporting the hypothesis that no knowledge of modality
is available. At PAS=WG comparatively more information seems to be
accessible, as suggested by the higher true positive rate and lower false
positive rate.
A loglinear model with response frequency as a function of
PAS level (NS and WG) and correctness of modality and stim-
ulus response shows a significant dependence between the three
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factors (χ2= 15.75, df= 1, p< 0.001). However, the dependence
between correctness of stimulus and modality report is modulated
by PAS. At PAS=NS correctness of modality and stimulus are
independent (χ2= 2.20, df= 1, p= 0.14) whereas at PAS=WG
they are dependent (χ2= 35.03, df= 1, p< 0.001). In other words:
(a) Without conscious experience, modality and stimulus correct-
ness do not modulate each other and (b) they do modulate each
other when there is weak conscious experience.
A bivariate logistic regression with stimulus and modality
correctness as outcome and PAS as predictor shows a signifi-
cant difference in odds ratios between stimulus and modality
correctness at PAS=NS, OR= 1.25, and PAS=WG, OR= 3.75,
z =−3.92, p< 0.001. This change in odds ratio by a factor of
three suggests a substantially stronger dependence between cor-
rectness of stimulus and modality report at PAS=WG compared
to PAS=NS.
We illustrate the combined effects of PAS with stimulus and
modality identification in Figures 6 and 7. Based on a logistic
regression with PAS and stimulus identification as predictors of
modality (Figure 6) and PAS and modality identification as pre-
dictors of stimulus (Figure 7), we see that at PAS=NS there is little
difference in probability of correct report of modality (stimulus)
when stimulus (modality) is identified correctly instead of incor-
rectly. In contrast, at PAS=WG there is a 19% points increase in
probability of correct modality identification and 29 percentage
points increase in correct stimulus identification when stimulus
(modality) is correctly identified. There are significant interac-
tions between PAS and correctness of modality report (χ2= 13.77,
df= 1, p< 0.001) and between PAS and correctness of stimulus
report (χ2= 13.32, df= 1, p< 0.001).
The two analyses with correctness of modality and stimulus
as, respectively, predictor, and response, suggest the difference
in probability at PAS=NS and WG of correct modality identi-
fication is different from the increase in probability of correct
stimulus identification, although this could not be directly tested.
FIGURE 6 | Probability of correct modality report as a function of PAS
and correctness of stimulus report. Ninety-five percent confidence
intervals for estimated probabilities are based on combined standard errors
of the estimates of fixed effects and interactions.
This necessitates having correctness of modality and correctness
of stimulus as response in the logistic regression, but with the
same variables as predictors (correctness of stimulus predict-
ing correctness of modality and vice versa). This would lead to
the same data point being used twice, one time with modal-
ity as response and stimulus as predictor, and one time where
these roles are switched. To avoid this, we split the trials into
two halves, considering modality as predictor for stimulus in the
one half and opposite in the second half. The logistic regres-
sion model now has three independent variables: “question” type
(modality/stimulus), correctness of reply to this question and PAS
level.
We fit a logistic regression model with subject as a random effect
and modulating question (modality/stimulus), correctness of
reply to this question, and PAS level as fixed effects, predicting the
correctness of the “other” question (stimulus/modality). We find
no three-way interaction between question, its correctness and
PAS (χ2= 0.40, df= 1, p= 0.53). Neither is there an interaction
between question and its correctness (χ2= 0.46, df= 1, p= 0.67).
However, we do see an interaction between PAS and question
(χ2= 13.53, df= 1, p= 0.0002), and between PAS and correctness
of reply to the question (χ2= 13.29, df= 1, p= 0.0003).). This
suggests the difference between PAS=NS and WG for modality
and stimulus reporting is different. Clearly the probability of cor-
rect report increases between the stimulus predictor and modality
predictor since chance level is higher for modality report, however
this analysis suggests the difference in report correctness between
PAS=NS and WG for modality and stimulus report as predictors
is further modulated by the interaction between PAS and predictor
question correctness
In a subanalysis considering only cases where the predictor
report was incorrect (the left bar groups in Figures 6 and 7) there
was a significant interaction between PAS and report (χ2= 9.11,
df= 1, p= 0.003) whereas the PAS main effect was not (z =−0.49,
p= 9.63), suggesting that PAS modulates modality correctness
FIGURE 7 | Probability of correct stimulus report given correctness of
modality report and PAS. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for
estimated probabilities are based on combined standard errors of the
estimates of fixed effects and interactions.
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when stimulus is incorrect, but PAS does not modulate stimulus
correctness when modality is incorrect.
DISCUSSION
Our experiment confirms that the correct identification of a stim-
ulus co-varies with PAS rating. When subjects report not to see
anything, they are at chance level, whereas they are significantly
above chance whenever they report a “brief (visual) glimpse.”
More surprisingly, this relationship is essentially the same for iden-
tification of modality. At least under the conditions of this experi-
ment, knowledge of perceptual modality seems only to exist, or to
be accessible, when there is at least a weak conscious experience.
For modality reports, results may indicate that less information is
necessary compared to reports about stimuli in order for subjects
to be at or close to maximal correctness (see Figure 4 compared
to Figure 3).
As a further note on methodology, we point out that to demon-
strate equivalence between actual probabilities and fixed values we
operationally “switched” the common null-hypothesis (true para-
meter equal to fixed value) and the alternative (true parameter
different from fixed value). This ensures the risk of falsely declaring
equivalence is bounded by the fixed significance level, alpha= 5%,
and constitutes the FDA-recommended methodological proce-
dure in equivalence trials (Berger and Hsu, 1996; US Department
of Health, and Human Services, Food, and Drug Administration,
1999). Hypothesis tests are based on the same distributional char-
acteristics of the test statistic as in the traditional null-hypothesis
test, but with other critical regions. Importantly, the traditional
confidence interval for the parameter of interest serves the dual
purpose of quantifying confidence in the estimated parameter as
well as being instrumental in testing equivalence. We stress that the
use of the 90% CI in equivalence testing is purely operational, and
may not necessarily apply to other types of equivalence (Berger
and Hsu, 1996) tests.
In the context of this experiment, and with the aid of this statis-
tical approach, we demonstrate that the ability to identify modality
above chance level seems dependent on PAS level. However, cor-
rect modality identification seems a necessary precondition for
correct stimulus identification above chance level, regardless of
PAS level. Thus, stimulus and modality identification seem not to
be mutually independent processes.
This result goes against the source misidentification hypothe-
sis, while it supports the intuition that reports about conscious
experiences related to, e.g., a visual stimulus, are in fact also
experienced and reported as visual when experience is sampled
in an appropriately sensitive manner. As it would hardly be argued
that such vague experiences are auditory or belong to some other
sense, a competing position might argue in favor of some “modal-
ity free” representation of a stimulus with a non-sensory experi-
ence attached to it. Such an idea is however also rejected by these
results, as stimulus identification does not occur above chance level
scores in the absence of modality identification.
It is important to mention that we of course do not consider
all possible conscious experiences sensory, and that the hypothesis
here is tested in a rather narrow framework, comparing visual, and
auditory perception only. Accordingly, it cannot be guaranteed that
the results would generalize to other modalities or different stim-
ulus material. However, the experiment does set up one case for
which our competing hypotheses have strong and different expec-
tations of the outcome. For this reason, one appears strengthened
and the other weakened.
It is, also, not obviously the case that these results generalize to
blindsight, although the hypotheses were derived from this area of
research. Nevertheless, the interpretation of blindsight as a pure
contrast in consciousness research crucially relies on the correct-
ness of the source misidentification hypothesis. For this reason,
further research with this particular focus could be of much value.
One might argue there is still one conceptual issue to discuss:
which PAS scale points represent a lack of conscious experience? In
the conceptual framework behind the experiment, as suggested in
the introduction, consciousness is associated with any subjectively
notable visual experience related to the stimulus. In consequence,
for vision to be unconscious or subliminal, nothing related to
the stimulus must be experienced. This is the case for PAS=NS
only. A different interpretation of consciousness could be that the
content of the stimulus must be identified for something to be
conscious. In such a case, a visual experience of stimulation, in
which the subject is unable to report the content of the stimulus,
would not count as conscious perception. In such a case PAS=WG
would also be unconscious, although this is not what is typically
meant by the term (Metzinger, 2000; Cowey, 2004; Overgaard and
Sandberg, 2012).
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